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UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS AT LITTLE ROCK
LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 12 1989-90 NUMBER 3
SCHLEMMER v. FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE CO.:
A CASE FOR RETHINKING ARKANSAS' CHOICE-OF-
LAW RULE FOR INTERSTATE TORTS
L. Lynn Hogue*
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1977, Arkansas applied the law of the place of the acci-
dent, the lex loci delicti,I a rule popularized by the first Restatement of
Conflict of Laws,2 to resolve choice-of-law issues in cases in interstate
torts.3 In Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co.4 the Arkansas Supreme
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College, 1966; M.A., University of Tennessee, 1968; Ph.D., 1972; J.D., Duke University, 1974.
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The author wishes to thank Dean Marjorie Fine Knowles for the Faculty Research Grant
from the Georgia State University College of Law which supported the preparation of this
article and Georgia State University and the University System of Georgia for the sabbatical
leave of absence during which this article was completed.
1. McGinty v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W. 2d 891 (1966). Compare
Turkey Express, Inc. v. Skelton Motor Co., 246 Ark. 739, 439 S.W.2d 923 (1969).
2. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934). The first Restatement was
heavily influenced by Joseph H. Beale's theories of territoriality and vested rights. Beale's
theories were later discredited. See, e.g., W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942). "Walter Wheeler Cook discredited the vested-rights theory as
thoroughly as the intellect of one man can ever discredit the intellectual produce of another."
Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 964, 966 (1958),
reprinted in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 6 (1963).
3. For a fuller history, see Hogue, Arkansas' New Choice of Law Rule for Interstate
Torts: A Critique of Wallis, Williams, and the "Better Rule of Law," 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 713,
714-17 (1978). The Arkansas Supreme Court had signaled its willingness to reconsider the lex
loci rule of the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) in McGinty v. Ballentine Pro-
duce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966).
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Court departed from this mechanical conflicts rule, which it had fol-
lowed for some time, and adopted instead an eclectic fusion of Dr.
Robert A. Leflar's "better rule of law" methodology5 and the second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws. With the decision in Schlemmer v.
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. ,6 the marriage between the second Re-
statement and the "better rule" theory apparently is ended, and Ar-
kansas now has a unitary choice-of-law theory for interstate torts-
the "better rule of law."7
After Williams v. Carr' was decided closely on the heels of Wal-
lis, I criticized both the Wallis and Williams decisions because they
were decided under mistake of law.9 It appeared illogical to me (and
ultimately silly) to decide a case on the basis of which state has the
"better" rule of law when the competing laws are never correctly as-
certained and therefore never clearly before the court for its assess-
ient-as was the case in both Wallis and Williams. As I earlier
suggested, the court's approach not only defied Leflar's procedure-
"A state's 'governmental interest' in a set of facts can be analyzed
only by reference to the content of the competing rules of law" '0 -but
"it reaches a choice of law effected in a legal vacuum-a conflict of
laws hardly ripe for judicial resolution."" In Wallis the Arkansas
Supreme Court ignored the content of applicable Missouri law on the
question of whether Missouri law permitted recovery by a contribu-
4. 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977). See Note, Wallis v. Mrm Smith's Pie Co., 1 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 103 (1978).
5. See, e.g., R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 281-
82, 391-92 (4th ed. 1986) ("There are numerous cases [citing inter alia Wallis as a fusion of the
choice-influencing considerations, significant relationships and governmental interests] which
cite and undertake to follow authorities supporting two or three or all of the current ap-
proaches. This tends to pull them together, as the new law." Id. at 391-92 (emphasis in origi-
nal)). See also Reppy, Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34
MERCER L. REV. 645 (1983); Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., 10 (Spring 1977); Westbrook, A Survey and Evaluation of Competing
Choice-of-Law Methodologies: The Case for Eclecticism, 40 Mo. L. REV. 407 (1975); Leflar,
The "New" Choice of Law, 21 AM. U.L. REV. 457 (1972).
6. 292 Ark. 344, 730 S.W.2d 217 (1987). See Note, Arkansas Relies on Choice-Influenc-
ing Considerations and the "Better Rule of Law," 10 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 511 (1987-
88).
7. Dr. Leflar's "better rule of law" theory was developed and advanced in a series of
writings over several years beginning in 1966. See Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in
Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influenc-
ing Consideration, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966).
8. 263 Ark. 326, 565 S.W.2d 400 (1978).
9. Hogue, supra note 3.
10. Leflar, More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1587
(1966).
11. Hogue, supra note 3, at 730.
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torily negligent plaintiff. That law included both Missouri precedent
which allowed a jury to find that the conduct which served as the
basis of the Arkansas plaintiffs' claim was excusable as well as the
defense of last clear chance (known in Missouri as the humanitarian
doctrine).12 In Williams the court ignored the subtleties of Tennes-
see's rules on proximate and remote contributory negligence. 3
This criticism of the "better rule" approach-in essence that the
transition to the newer theory of "better rule" from lex loci was made
by the court without being faithful to the premises or methodology of
the theory or theories it purported to adopt- differs somewhat from
that advanced by other critics. For example, Professor von Mehren
bluntly observes that "[Dr. Leflar's] analysis in terms of five 'choice-
influencing considerations' . . . adds little toward solving the [prob-
lem of principled, comprehensible, and noninvidious solutions to
choice-of-law questions]." 14 Indeed, the "betterness" of a particular
law is impossible to gauge without general agreement on an appropri-
ate measure for laws. 5 The decision in Schlemmer demonstrates the
bankruptcy of the "better rule" method and amply justifies rethinking
Arkansas' choice-of-law rule for interstate torts. Schlemmer is
wrongly decided on two entirely separate but interrelated grounds. It
is wrong as a matter of choice of law, and it is wrong as a matter of
constitutional law.
The facts of Schlemmer v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. 16 are
deceptively straightforward. In May 1981 plaintiff/appellant Donna
Schlemmer drove her stepfather's car from her home in Memphis,
Tennessee, to the home of Rochelle Smith in West Memphis, Arkan-
sas. There Schlemmer and Smith got into another vehicle, an unin-
sured car owned by Smith's sister. Schlemmer and Smith then drove
together to a party elsewhere in West Memphis where they drank
beer. After some time had passed, Schlemmer told Smith that she
12. For the analysis upon which this conclusion rests, see id. at 717-22.
13. Id. at 726-30.
14. Von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV.
927, 952 (1975).
15. Id. at 952-53 ("An approach in terms of 'the better rule of law' probably complicates
the problem even further unless general agreement were to exist on the standards by which
superiority was to be judged."). See also von Mehren & Trautman, Constitutional Control of
Choice of Law: Some Reflections on Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 35, 50 n.50 (1981) ("[I]t
would be impermissible for the forum to justify application of its own law solely on the ground
that it finds its law easier to apply or that it regards its own law as better law simply because it
is its own law. Equally impermissible would be any methodology arbitrarily weighing the
scales in favor of forum law." (citations omitted)).
16. 292 Ark. 344, 730 S.W.2d 217 (1987).
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wanted to go home and prevailed on Smith to take her back to her
car. While on the way back to Schlemmer's car, Smith drove at an
excessive rate of speed on a rain-slick service road. Schlemmer asked
her to slow down, but Smith lost control of the car and wrecked it,
injuring Schlemmer.
Schlemmer brought suit against Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,
the insurer of her stepfather's car (the car Schlemmer drove to West
Memphis from Memphis, not the uninsured car involved in the acci-
dent) seeking coverage under the uninsured motor vehicle coverage
provision of the stepfather's policy. The defendant/appellee insur-
ance company moved for summary judgment contending, alterna-
tively, "that [the] plaintiff was not a covered person under her
stepfather's policy . . . [or] that the Arkansas guest statute barred
recovery by the plaintiff."17 The trial court applied Arkansas law and
held "that, as a matter of law, the guest statute barred recovery be-
cause the driver of the car was not driving in willful and wanton disre-
gard of the rights of others."1 " The plaintiff appealed and the
Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, holding that Arkansas' guest stat-
ute19 would not apply to these non-Arkansan litigants.20
To place matters in context, under Arkansas' guest statute, a
guest/plaintiff may still recover (assuming, of course that his or her
fault is not equal to or greater than that of the defendant 21 ) if he or
she can show that the host driver operated an automobile in a "willful
and wanton" manner.2 2 "Willful and wanton" conduct, a term of art,
is apparently more aggravated than "gross negligence," and the deter-
mination of when gross negligence becomes willful and wanton is one
for the jury.2 Although certain factual aspects of the Schlemmer
case-drinking and driving at a high rate of speed on rain-slick
roads24 -have been associated with findings of willful and wanton
17. Id. at 345, 730 S.W.2d at 218.
18. Id.
19. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-913 (repealed 1983).
20. 292 Ark. at 345, 730 S.W.2d at 218. The case was settled after having been remanded
for trial.
21. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (1987) (Arkansas' Comparative Faults Statute); see
also H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT 514 (2d ed. 1987). Where the host driver has been
drinking, "[t]he guest passenger assumes the risk of... his host driver's negligence .
H. WOODS, at 467 n. 1.
22. 0. HARRIS, ARKANSAS WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS 85 (1984) (see cases cited at 88
n.3).
23. Id. (see also cases cited at 89 n.8).
24. Moeller v. Theis Realty, Inc., 13 Ark. App. 266, 683 S.W.2d 239 (1985) (burden is on
moving party to show that, even though the facts may be in dispute, reasonable minds could
not differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from them).
462 [Vol. 12:459
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conduct, their mere presence does not preclude summary judgment.
For example, in Froman v. JR. Kelley Stave & Heading Co.25 the
court noted that the "testimony [in the case at trial] was sufficient to
support, as a matter of fact, the finding that the 'vehicle was willfully
and wantonly operated in disregard of the rights of others.' "26 The
testimony in Froman included evidence that the driver (the agent of
the host/defendant) drank beer and wine and later drove under their
influence at a high rate of speed, wrecking the car and injuring the
guest/plaintiffs. The testimony in the Froman case was disputed, and
the jury did not find for the plaintiffs.27 As the court was careful to
point out, the elements of drinking, driving too fast, and the like, do
not make out a case of willful and wanton conduct as a matter of
law.28
Although Schlemmer was remanded for trial, the parties subse-
quently settled. This critique shows that the Arkansas Supreme
Court's conclusion is wrong both as a matter of choice of law and as a
matter of constitutional law. Schlemmer and "the better rule of law"
theory should be abandoned by the court at its earliest opportunity.
II. ROLE OF THE GUEST STATUTE'S REPEAL
Repeal of Arkansas' guest statute29 changed state policy on re-
covery by plaintiff guests, but only prospectively. By its terms, the
repealing legislation applied "only to claims or causes of action aris-
25. 196 Ark. 808, 120 S.W.2d 164 (1938).
26. Id. at 814, 120 S.W.2d at 167.
27. This result was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 816, 120 S.W.2d at 168.
28. Id. at 814, 120 S.W.2d at 167. "This testimony was sufficient to support, as a matter
of fact, the finding that the 'vehicle was willfully and wantonly operated in disregard of the
rights of others.' But we cannot say, as a matter of law, that it entitled appellants to recover, for
the reason that [the testimony] was sharply disputed." Id. (emphasis added).
Other cases also support the point that whether driving while intoxicated constitutes will-
ful and wanton conduct is a question of fact for the jury. See, e.g., McCall v. Liberty, 248 Ark.
618, 453 S.W.2d 24 (1970); Bridges v. Stephens, 238 Ark. 801, 802-03, 384 S.W.2d 490-91
(1964) ("We think it goes without saying that one who drives a car while he is drunk may
fairly be held to be engaging in misconduct-criminal misconduct-that is both willful and
wanton."); Cooper v. Calico, 214 Ark. 853, 218 S.W.2d 723 (1949) (driving under the influence
of alcohol can be willful and wanton misconduct).
Some Arkansas cases bar recovery by a guest/plaintiff who fails to protest the actions of
the intoxicated host/defendant. See Lewis v. Chitwood Motor Co., 196 Ark. 86, 115 S.W.2d
1072 (1938); Beason v. Withington, 189 Ark. 211, 71 S.W.2d 461 (1934).
Compare Rone v. Miller, 257 Ark. 791, 796-98, 520 S.W.2d 268, 271-72 (1975) (the denial
of a directed verdict on the issue of willful and wanton misconduct was appropriate where
there was evidence of speeding at night on a curving road even absent intoxication).
29. 1983 Ark. Acts 13 (repealing Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-913).
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ing on or after its effective date."3 This language led Professor 0.
Fred Harris, Jr., (a former colleague at UALR, now on the law
faculty of the University of Illinois) to conclude in his Arkansas
Wrongful Death Actions that " 'claims and causes of action,' either
pending or arising prior to the effective date of the Act [repealing the
Arkansas guest statute], will likely be subject to the onerous eviden-
tiary requirements of the guest statutes."' 31
Unsurprisingly, purely domestic guest statute cases, otherwise on
all fours with Schlemmer, decided under the Arkansas guest statute
after the effective date of the repealing act but involving accidents
taking place before the effective date, treat the guest statute as control-
ling. For example, Goodnight v. Richardsona2 involved an accident
which occurred April 27, 1979. The case was decided May 13, 1985.
Justice Hickman's opinion notes: "[The defendant] pleaded the guest
statute. . . which has since been repealed. That statute provides that
a guest in a car does not have a cause of action against the owner or
operator of the car unless the driver's conduct was willful and wan-
ton."33 Another case, Lawrence v. Meux,34 in which all parties are
from Arkansas, also applies the guest statute. This prior case law
serves as an important benchmark both for conflicts purposes-as a
measure of Arkansas' interest in the recovery of a plaintiff/guest-
and for constitutional purposes-as a basis for assessing Arkansas'
nexus with the litigation for due process purposes. However, these
cases went unnoted by the court in Schlemmer.31
Consideration by the Arkansas Supreme Court of the choice-of-
law issue in Schlemmer is more truncated than it might have been
because a coherent presentation of Tennessee law was not before the
court. Justice Dudley, writing for the majority, holds that Tennessee
law applies to the case on remand because "Tennessee does not have a
guest statute. ' 36 Quoting extensively from an early article by Dr. Le-
flar criticizing guest statutes as "archaic, anachronistic, out of keeping
with the times," 37 Justice Dudley concludes that Tennessee's law is
30. Id.
31. 0. HARRIS, supra note 22, at 88.
32. 286 Ark. 38, 688 S.W.2d 941 (1985).
33. Id. at 40, 688 S.W.2d at 942 (citations omitted).
34. 282 Ark. 512, 669 S.W.2d 464 (1984). ("This case was tried under the now repealed
'guest statute' . . . ."; Id. at 514, 669 S.W.2d at 466.)
35. Justice Hickman refers only to cases applying the guest statute "until it was repealed
by the legislature." Schlemmer, 292 Ark. at 348, 730 S.W.2d at 220 (Hickman, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 347, 730 S.W.2d at 219.
37. Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Arkansas-The Choice-Influencing Considerations, 28 ARK.
L. REV. 199, 215 (1974) (cited in Schlemmer, 292 Ark. at 347, 730 S.W.2d at 219).
[Vol. 12:459
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"better." But what is Tennessee law?
Although under Arkansas law, and indeed the law of most juris-
dictions,38 the plaintiff has the burden of pleading any foreign law
(e.g., Tennessee law) on which she seeks to rely,39 we know little
about the content of Tennessee law from the opinion. What we do
know is that Donna Schlemmer, the Tennessee plaintiff, brought her
action in Arkansas in the teeth of Arkansas' guest statute. Examina-
tion of the content of Tennessee law illuminates the reasons for this
apparently counter-intuitive strategy.
At least two factors must have motivated her to elect an Arkan-
sas forum. First, the Tennessee guest/plaintiff apparently sought a
recovery that was more attractive than that available in her home
state of Tennessee. Second, the action had to be worth the risk that
Arkansas would decline to exempt a foreign plaintiff from the rigors
of the guest statute. To be more favorable to the foreign plaintiff,
however, Arkansas law somehow had to be divorced from its general
policy of nonrecovery by plaintiff/guests. This leads to the suspicion
that there is more to Tennessee law than its lack of a guest statute.
III. CHOICE OF FORUM
A possible explanation for Donna Schlemmer's election to sue in
Arkansas can be found in the differential treatment which each state
affords for direct actions against insurers in uninsured motorist cases.
Under Tennessee case law construing the Tennessee Uninsured Mo-
torist Act,4° the injured party must bring an action against the unin-
sured motorist and prosecute it to judgment before an action can be
brought against an insurer.' An insurer also has a right to subroga-
tion against the uninsured motorist who caused the injury unless the
insurer is subjected to a direct action. 2 Thus, for Donna Schlemmer
38. See, e.g., UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT 44.1; see
also FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
39. The rules of proof are lax: "[i]n determining the law of any jurisdiction or govern-
mental unit outside this State, the court may consider any relevant material or source, includ-
ing testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the rules of evidence."
ARK. R. Civ. P. 44. 1(b). See Arkansas Appliance Distrib. Co. v. Tandy Elecs., Inc., 292 Ark.
482, 730 S.W.2d 899 (1987) (contract action).
40. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-7-1201 to 1206 (1989).
41. Glover v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Insurance Co., 225 Tenn. 306, 312-13, 468 S.W.2d
727, 729 (1971); Hickey v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 239 F. Supp. 109 (D.C. Tenn. 1965); see Note,
Uninsured Motorist Insurance: Selected Tennessee Procedural Aspects, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV.
746 (1980).
42. Glover v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 225 Tenn. 306, 468 S.W.2d 727 (1971).
Subrogation is available only "to the extent . . . of the rights of the person to whom such
payment has been made. ... TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-1204(a) (1989). In Glover the court
4651989-90]
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to have sued in Tennessee, she would first have had to sue her friend,
Rochelle Smith, before seeking compensation from the insurer. The
insurer would then have had the right to reimbursement from Smith
for what it paid out to Schlemmer.
In contrast, under Arkansas law, Schlemmer had the option of
bringing an action against the insured motorist, the insurer, or both.43
As noted above, if the direct action in Arkansas was successful, it
would have defeated the insurer's right to subrogation under Tennes-
see law. In short, in Arkansas Donna Schlemmer could sue her step-
father's insurer44 without the doubtless, unsavory necessity of suing
her friend Rochelle Smith or having her friend remain -liable for any
recovery she might obtain from her insurer.
This contrast between the laws of Tennessee and Arkansas ex-
plains why Schlemmer would bring suit in the teeth of Arkansas'
guest statute. Tennessee law had certain clear procedural disincen-
tives in uninsured motorist cases, and there was a chance that Arkan-
sas might not hold a foreign guest/plaintiff to the same harsh law to
which local plaintiffs were subject in view of the legislature's abandon-
ment of the guest statute as a defense. This also helps explain why
Schlemmer is such a novel case and quite unlike the run-of-the-mill
guest statute cases.45
interpreted this language as allowing subrogation only "where the insurer has paid off a settle-
ment or judgment recovered by the insured against the uninsured motorist .... " 225 Tenn.
at 310, 468 S.W.2d at 729. "A direct action would, therefore, deny the insurer's right to
subrogation." Note, supra note 4, at 748. Accord McCall v. Maryland Casualty Co., 516
S.W.2d 353 (Tenn. 1974). The exceptions to the Tennessee direct action proscription- acci-
dents involving hit-and-run drivers and uninsured drivers who cannot be located and served-
are of no relevance to the Schlemmer situation. See Note, supra note 4, at 751-52.
43. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Warren, 246 Ark. 323, 438 S.W.2d 31 (1969).
44. Assuming she was a covered person under her stepfather's policy-an issue never
resolved. See Schlemmer, 292 Ark. at 345, 730 S.W.2d at 218.
45. Schlemmer does not even fit within Judge Fuld's rules or "principles ... proposed as
sound for situations involving guest statutes in conflicts settings:"
I. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same state,
and the car is there registered, the law of that state should control and determine the
standard of care which the host owes to his guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that state
does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held liable by reason
of the fact that liability would be imposed upon him under the tort law of the state of
the victim's domicile. Conversely, when the guest was injured in the state of his own
domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver who has come into that state should
not-in the absence of special circumstances-be permitted to interpose the law of
his state as a defense.
3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in different
states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the applicable rule of deci-
sion will be that of the state where the accident occurred but not if it can be shown
1989-90] CONFLICT OF LAWS 467
It is also interesting to note that the Schlemmer case, when filed
in Arkansas on May 7, 1984,46 would have been time-barred in Ten-
nessee.4 7 This also helps to account for the decision to sue in Arkan-
sas. Application of a forum state's statute of limitations, of course,
presents no constitutional difficulties even though it results in a de-
fendant being liable to suit in one jurisdiction while not in another.48
So long as defendants are treated similarly within the forum, there is
no cause for complaint.49 While there is no quibble with Schlemmer's
availing herself of the benefits of Arkansas law, given that the case is
appropriately in an Arkansas forum (including a coherent choice of
law), there is the overarching question of whether she should have the
benefits that Arkansas law affords without being subjected to its bur-
dens, including the guest statute-whether she can fairly take the hide
and leave the tail. This question will be explored both from a conflicts
and a constitutional perspective.
that displacing that normally applicable rule will advance the relevant substantive
law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or
producing great uncertainty for litigants. (Cf Restatement, 2d, Conflict of Laws,
P.O.D., pt. II, §§ 146, 159 [later adopted and promulgated May 23, 1969].)
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 128, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 70, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58
(1972).
Instance 1 is not Schlemmer because the car is not registered in the same state as that in
which the guest-passenger and host-driver are domiciled. Whether the rule should be applied
in the absence of that factor is an issue beyond the scope of this article. It is obvious, however,
that where, as in Schlemmer, the car involved is not registered in any sthte, including the state
of injury which is also the state where it is garaged, the state of injury may have an interest of
equal or greater moment than the state of the domicile of the host and guest.
Instance 2 is not Schlemmer because the driver's conduct did not occur in her state of
domicile, and instance 3 is not Schlemmer because host and guest share a domicile.
46. Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Schlemmer, 292
Ark. 344, 730 S.W.2d 217 (No. 86-256). I am indebted to Elton A. Rieves, IV of Rieves &
Mayton, West Memphis, Arkansas, for copies of the above-cited Brief and a discovery deposi-
tion of Donna Schlemmer taken February 26, 1985, both of which proved helpful in the prepa-
ration of this article.
47. There is a one-year statute of limitations for tort claims such as this in Tennessee.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104(a) (1980); see Note, supra note 41, at 760; Comment, Uninsured
Motorist Coverage in Tennessee, 38 TENN. L. REV. 391 (1971); compare ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-56-115 (1987) (five-year statute of limitations). Under the new Arkansas Uniform Con-
flict of Laws Limitations Act, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-56-201 to 210 (1987) (effective July 1,
1985), the applicable statute of limitations would be selected by Arkansas' choice-of-law rule,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-202(a)(2) (1978).
48. See, e.g., Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953) (application of a shorter
forum statute of limitations upheld; "[T]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel the
forum state to use the period of limitation of a foreign state." Id. at 516).
49. See, e.g., Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); see also First Nat'l Bank v. United
Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
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IV. INTEREST ANALYSIS
I suggest approaching Schlemmer from the perspective of inter-
est analysis because that technique is particularly useful for illuminat-
ing conflicts problems. The late Professor Brainerd Currie developed
a method of conflicts analysis that stressed identification of the com-
peting governmental policies implicit in conflicting laws50 and sought
to resolve conflicts of law by identifying and valuing the competing
governmental policies or interests brought into conflict in a given
case.5' I should note that no effort is made here to address the critics
of interest analysis,52 whose work I find on the whole unpersuasive
and who have been effectively answered elsewhere.53
Quite simply, under interest analysis, a true conflict exists where
two jurisdictions have identifiable policies that would be furthered by
the application of their respective laws. In a false conflict, one state
has no policy, or only a spurious one, to justify application of its law,
while the other state has a legitimate claim. 4 Another category is the
"unprovided-for" case in which an examination of interests and poli-
50. Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 964, 966
(1958), reprinted in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
51. See R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th ed., 1987), 202-
05. This technique underlies my earlier critique as well. Hogue, supra note 3, at 715.
52. Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations, 46 OHIO
ST. L.J. 459 (1985); Btilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH.
L. REV. 392 (1980); Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1585
(1985); Juenger, Governmental Interest-Real and Spurious-in Multistate Disputes, 21 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 515, 528-33 (1988); Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis,
32 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1984); Korn, The Choice of Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 772 (1983).
53. Posnak, Choice of Law: Interest Analysis and Its "New Critics," 36 AM. J. COMP. L.
681, 684-89 (1988) ("Unwittingly, these critics created strawmen." Id. at 685); Sedler, Interest
Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the "New Critics," 34
MERCER L. REV. 593, 606-20 (1983) (Brilmayer "has launched a sweeping attack on interest
analysis as a basic approach to choice of law based on a complete--one might almost say
deliberate-misconception of what interest analysis is all about." Id. at 609).
In addition, because, as will be seen, I view Schlemmer as a false conflict, there is little
likelihood of disagreement that only the law of an interested state should apply since that
proposition is generally accepted. Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its
Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 179 n.19 (1981).
54. For recent summaries of Currie's methodology, see R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H.
KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 202-05, 222-34 (4th ed. 1987); R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL, R.
FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 267-70 (4th ed. 1986); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 16-20 (1982); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 7-8 (3d
ed. 1986). See also Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An
Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 577 (1980); Sedler, The Govern-
mental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 181, 243 (1977); Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws:
A Response to the "New Critics," 34 MERCER L. REV. 593 (1983).
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cies does not yield a solution because a disinterested forum is unable
to choose between competing policies in which it has no stake; no
state has an interest because neither state has a policy which would be
advanced by an application of its law." Recent scholarship has per-
suasively demonstrated that the "unprovided-for" case is chimeri-
cal. 5 6 Interest analysis is most useful in resolving false conflicts since
a determination that a state has either no interest or a specious inter-
est in applying its law makes the ascertainment of the correct law
straightforward. Indeed, many of the conflicts casebook chestnuts are
false conflicts (e.g., Alabama Great S. R.R. Co. v. Carroll,57 Milliken v.
Pratt,58 and In re Estate of Jones59) just as Wallis' and Williams6I
are also false conflicts. True conflicts are resolved by applying the
rule of the forum since the forum by definition has an interest 62 and
since there is no principled basis for displacing that interest, as Cali-
fornia's experiments with "comparative impairment" have shown.63
The "better rule" theory's fatal flaw is its insensitivity to interests;
false conflicts and true conflicts are treated alike.
As I have noted before,61 the "better rule" theory is applied with
apparent success to the solution of both false and true conflicts,
although this is merely an artifact. This conclusion perhaps is best
illustrated by comparing three cases which rely on the "better rule"
theory. The first two, Milkovich v. Saari65 and Hunker v. Royal In-
demnity Co.,66 are factually similar; both were resolved under the
"better rule" approach. Hunker and a third case, Bigelow v. Hal-
loran,67 are cited by Leflar as examples of the successful application of
the "better rule" theory. 6 Hunker and Bigelow are also important
55. The "unprovided-for case" is one in which policies are not in conflict and "neither
state cares what happens." R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th ed.
1987), 282-87.
56. Kramer, The Myth of the "Unprovided-For" Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045 (1989).
57. 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
58. 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
59. 192 Iowa 78, 182 N.W. 227 (1921).
60. 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977).
61. 263 Ark. 326, 565 S.W.2d 400 (1978).
62. Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1235 (1963).
63. See Kay, supra note 54.
64. Hogue, supra note 3, at 724.
65. 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
66. 57 Wis. 2d 588, 204 N.W.2d 897 (1973).
67. 313 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1981).
68. R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 54, at 389 n.3 (Bigelow and Hun-
ker); Leflar, Choice of Law: States' Rights, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 203, 210 n.41 (1981)
(Hunker).
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because in each the forum court holds that foreign law applies (i.e., in
terms of the methodology followed) and finds that foreign law is "bet-
ter" than domestic forum law. What will be apparent, however, is
that in both instances, foreign law applied not because it was "better,"
but because the forum had no interest in applying its own law.
I begin with Milkovich in which a foreign plaintiff/guest and de-
fendant/host, both from Ontario, had an accident in Minnesota. On-
tario had a guest statute requiring proof of gross negligence on the
defendant's part in order for plaintiff to recover. Minnesota, where
the automobile accident occurred, had no guest statute. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court, applying the "better rule" of law, held Minne-
sota law governed the case:
In our search for the better rule, we are firmly convinced of the
superiority of the common-law rule of liability to that of the Onta-
rio guest statute. We can find little reason for the strict limitation
of a host's liability to his guest beyond the fear of collusive suits
and the vague disapproval of a guest "biting the hand that feeds
him." Neither rationale is persuasive. We are convinced the judi-
cial system can uncover collusive suits without such overinclusive
rules, and we do not find any discomfort in the prospect of a guest
suing his host for injuries suffered through the host's simple
negligence.69
The result in Milkovich is correct; Minnesota law applied. However,
the reason Minnesota law applied is unrelated to its relative "better-
ness." Minnesota law applied because both Ontario and Minnesota
had an interest in applying their respective laws--Ontario to protect
its resident defendant from recovery by a resident guest in defiance of
its established legislative policy and Minnesota to facilitate a recovery
out of which the expenses owed medical and other emergency credi-
tors could be satisfied. Minnesota law applied because Milkovich is a
true conflict adjudicated in a Minnesota forum.7"
In contrast, Hunker v. Royal Indemnity Co.71 involves the issue
of whether to apply an Ohio law barring suits against co-employees or
a Wisconsin (forum) law permitting such suits in an action by an
Ohio plaintiff against an Ohio defendant, insurer of the co-employee
driver, to an accident occurring in Wisconsin. Despite a prolix review
by the court of the various choice-influencing considerations purport-
ing to identify the "better rule of law," the case is nothing more than
69. 295 Minn. 155, 171, 203 N.W.2d 408, 417 (1973).
70. Hogue, supra note 3, at 727; Trautman, A Comment, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 465, 467
(1967).
71. 57 Wis. 2d 588, 204 N.W.2d 897 (1973).
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a false conflict in which Wisconsin has no interest in applying its law
to a dispute between two Ohio residents. Unlike the situation in
Milkovich, in which medical creditors in Minnesota required assur-
ance of assets out of which their obligations could be satisfied, the
Wisconsin court in Hunker is careful to point out that the Ohio plain-
tiff had already received a workers' compensation award72 and that
medical creditors had been satisfied.73 The court's labored conclusion
that, notwithstanding a complete absence of Wisconsin interests, Wis-
consin law is not "better" and Ohio law should be applied, trivializes
the choice-of-law process it purports to undertake.
Another Leflar example, Bigelow v. Halloran,74 also follows the
"better rule" approach and concludes that foreign law is to be pre-
ferred over forum law. Examination of the facts in Bigelow suggests
that the sheer outrageousness of the case and the court's desire to
avoid a harsh result for a widow who had already suffered much (a
classic "widows and orphans" case) had more to do with the result
than the determination of which state had the "better rule of law."
As the court dispassionately described the matter, plaintiff "Jean E.
Bigelow, a widow with two minor children, was seriously injured
when she was struck in the face and head by a shotgun blast fired by
defendant's decedent, Ralph Mathias. ' '75 Bigelow was shot as she
sought to escape from her Iowa farmhouse where she was being held
hostage by Mathias. Mathias then shot and killed himself. The issue
was whether to apply Minnesota's statute, which included a common
law bar against intentional tort actions after the death of either party
(which would have left the widow with nothing and allowed the heirs
of Mathias to split everything), or Iowa's statute, which would allow
survival of the action. The Minnesota court found Iowa's more gen-
erous provision to be the "better law." The case is a false conflict
since Iowa has no interest in the application of its law-all parties to
the case resided in Minnesota at the time of the suit-and wrongly
decided (harsh though that judgment seems).
Interest analysis reveals that Milkovich is a true conflict and fo-
rum law is properly applied not because it is better, but because the
forum as well as the foreign state have interests. Both Hunker and
Bigelow are false conflicts. Hunker correctly applies foreign law be-
cause only the foreign state has an interest in having its law apply,
72. Id. at 595, 204 N.W.2d at 901.
73. Id. at 605, 204 N.W.2d at 906.
74. 313 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1981).
75. Id. at 11.
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and Bigelow incorrectly applies foreign law since only the forum state
has an interest. Yet both cases find foreign law to be "better." This
blindness to interests and uncritical recourse to abstract concepts of
"betterness" is the weakness of the "better rule" theory.
Bigelow is like Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,76 which it cites, 7
7
in that the plaintiff was originally a resident of another state but
moved to Minnesota before bringing suit there. Indeed, the defects in
the "better rule" approach are nicely summarized in the numerous
critiques of Hague,78 in which the Minnesota Supreme Court followed
the "better rule" of Minnesota and allowed stacking of uninsured mo-
torist coverage. For example, Justice Stevens' observation that "I re-
gard the Minnesota courts' decision to apply forum law as unsound as
a matter of conflicts law" 79 has been echoed by others.8"
Because of the factual and legal variations in guest statute cases,
there can be false conflicts or true conflicts. Consider the following
examples of permutations involving guest statutes.
Example I: A domestic guest and host are involved in an acci-
dent in a foreign state that has a guest statute and suit is filed in a
domestic forum that does not have a guest statute.81 Can the domes-
tic host/defendant claim the benefit of the foreign guest statute as a
defense, thereby requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's
negligence was more serious than ordinary negligence (e.g., gross,
willful, wanton) and thereby defeat recovery?82 Example I, a
casebook classic, is a false conflict; the guest statute state lacks any
76. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
77. 313 N.W.2d at 12-13.
78. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
79. Id. at 331 (Stevens, J., concurring).
80. See Silberman, Can the State of Minnesota Bind the Nation?: Federal Choice-ofLaw
Constraints After Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 103 (1981) ("There is
little doubt that the decision of the Minnesota court to apply its own law was wrong, and
would be condemned by most choice-of-law theories." Id. at 104; see id. at 108-10); Wein-
traub, Who's Afraid of Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law?, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 17
(1981) ("undesirable and unwise," id. at 17; "I also agree with Justice Steven that the...
decision was 'plainly unsound as a matter of normal conflicts law.' " Id. at 24); Twerski, On
Territoriality and Sovereignty: System Shock and Constitutional Choice of Law, 10 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 149 (1981) ("makes no sense," id. at 170). But see Leflar, Choice of Law: States'
Rights, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 203, 210 (1981).
81. 1.e., holds the defendant to the standard of ordinary negligence in guest/host cases.
82. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E. 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) (domestic
guest; domestic host; foreign accident [situs guest statute]; domestic forum); Clark v. Clark,
107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966) (same); Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d
526 (1966) (same); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 294-95 (3d
ed. 1986); BRILMAYER, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A Challenge, 35 MER-
CER L. REV. 555, 556 (1984).
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interest in having its law applied, and "[ilt would make no sense to
apply [the foreign] guest statute."18 3
Example II: A foreign guest and host are involved in an accident
in a state with no guest statute; an action is brought in a domestic
forum in a state which has a guest statute. Can the foreign host claim
the benefit of his/her own foreign guest statute as a defense?8 4 Exam-
ple II presents a true conflict; the domicile of the foreign host/defend-
ant has an interest in him/her not becoming a public charge, and the
forum where the accident took place also has an interest in creating
liquidity to satisfy creditors who have extended emergency or medical
aid in the forum state to the accident victims.8 " Numerous cases illus-
trate Example 11.86
Example III: A domestic guest and foreign host are involved in
a foreign accident in the host's domicile which has a guest statute; suit
is filed in a domestic forum. Can the foreign host claim the benefit of
his/her own foreign guest statute as a defense?87 Example III
presents a true conflict as did Example II and for the same reasons.
Example IV: A foreign guest and domestic host are involved in a
foreign accident; suit is filed in a domestic forum, but the foreign state
where the accident takes place has a guest statute. Can the domestic
host claim the benefit of the foreign guest statute as a defense? 8 Ex-
ample IV presents a false conflict. The foreign state, which is the situs
of the accident, has no interest in protecting hosts (and hosts' insur-
83. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 82, at 295.
84. Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973) (foreign guest; foreign host
[host's domicile has guest statute]; domestic accident; domestic forum-forum law applied);
Gagne v. Berry, 112 N.H. 125, 290 A.2d 624 (1972) (same); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wisc. 2d
468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968) (same); Kell v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647
(1965) aff'd 26 A.D.2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966) (same). In Gagne, subsequent to the
accident in 1968, Massachusetts had repealed its guest statute; this parallels Schlemmer's facts.
85. Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws,
10 STAN. L. REV. 205 (1958), reprinted in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1963) ("There is [a] need to secure reimbursement for medical and other services
rendered locally. ... ) Id. at 145 n.64.
86. Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Kell v. Henderson, 47
Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965), aff'd 26 A.D.2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966). See
also the false conflict examples Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); and Kopp
v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966).
87. Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970). See Von Mehren, Choice of
Law and The Problem of Justice, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 27, 40 (Spring 1977).
88. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972) (for-
eign guest; domestic host; foreign accident [situs guest statute]; domestic forum). See also,
Miller v. Gay, 323 Pa. Super. 466, 470 A.2d 1353 (1983) ("neither state seems to have a
significant relationship as to the issue of guest vs. host protection," id. at 470, 470 A.2d at
1355).
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ers) who are out of state.8 9
Example V: As in Example II, a foreign guest and host are in-
volved in a domestic accident; suit is filed in a domestic forum. This
time, however the host is from a state which lacks a guest statute and
the forum has a guest statute. Can the foreign host/defendant claim
the benefit of the guest statute as a defense?9" As with Example IV,
Example V presents a false conflict in which the forum state has no
interest either in facilitating recovery by the plaintiff, since by its en-
actment of a guest statute it has subordinated the interest of medical
and other similarly situated domestic creditors, or in protecting the
foreign host/defendant.
Schlemmer, Example V above, is admittedly a novel case be-
cause, if it were not a conflicts case and merely involved a domestic
host, a domestic guest and a domestic accident in a forum state with a
guest statute, the plaintiff/guest would have to sue in the teeth of the
guest statute-ordinarily a quixotic venture.
Sound reasons for resorting to an interest analysis which would
have identified Schlemmer as a false conflict and pointed the way to-
ward its correct resolution can be found in the dissents of Justices
Hays and Hickman in Schlemmer; indeed, interest analysis seems to
inform their conclusions.9' Those dissents raise two issues to which I
now turn in detail-the absence of any Arkansas interest in the case
and the issue of conflicts fairness (judged vis-a-vis a case involving
non-Arkansans in comparison with a purely domestic case where both
parties are from Arkansas).
As a point of departure, it is clear that Arkansas has no interest
in applying its law to this dispute between two Tennesseans. Justice
Hays makes that point in the first paragraph of his dissent:
I have no disagreement with applying Tennessee law to a dispute
between a Tennessee resident and a Tennessee insurer over the cov-
erage of an insurance policy issued in Tennessee, assuming Arkan-
sas has jurisdiction to decide the issue. But with respect to the
liability of Rochelle Smith to Donna Schlemmer, the majority
opinion concludes that Tennessee law applies and with that I
89. Kramer, The Myth of the "Unprovided-For" Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1056-60
(1989).
90. Schlemmer v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 292 Ark. 344, 730 S.W.2d 217 (1987).
91. Compare the conclusion of the student note writer who considered Schlemmer: "The
dissenters in Schlemmer are applying the 'most significant relationship' test of the Second Re-
statement, although they do not call it by name." Note, supra note 6, at 520 (citations
omitted).
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disagree. 92
The clarity of this conclusion, one that interest analysis compels, is
complicated, however, by the fact that, in order to vindicate Arkan-
sas' absence of interest in this dispute, Arkansas must apply its guest
statute as a means of asserting its disinterest, or noninterest (i.e.,
neither favoring plaintiff nor defendant). By failing to recognize Ar-
kansas' noninterest in this false conflict and by applying a law that
would, in effect, keep Arkansas law out of the case, the court reaches
the anomalous and unprincipled result of applying a different rule to a
foreign defendant in a conflicts case than it would apply to a domestic
defendant in a purely domestic case. Thus, Schlemmer differs mark-
edly from prior Arkansas guest statute cases as well as from conflicts
cases such as Milkovich and Kell. Schlemmer, as both Justices Hays
and Hickman implicitly recognized in their separate dissents, is a false
conflict. The Arkansas Supreme Court's decision to lay aside the
guest statute in an interstate case occurring after the enactment of the
guest statute but before its effective date, while it had not done so in a
purely domestic case, does not supply an interest. The case is thus
wrongly decided as a matter of conflicts law. As with the earlier cases
of Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co. 93 and Williams v. Carr,9 4 the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court chose law in a vacuum. In a very real sense, the
court did not choose the "better rule" of law. The content of Tennes-
see law was never adequately before the court. Rather, the court in
Schlemmer merely weighed glib generalizations about guest statutes.
The matter, unfortunately, does not end there. The denial to the for-
eign defendant of a defense otherwise available to a domestic defend-
ant violates the federal constitution.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
A. Due Process
A federal constitutional issue exists as to whether it is permissible
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, as con-
strued in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts95 and Allstate Insurance Co.
v. Hague,96 for Arkansas to deny a foreign defendant access to the
defense of the Arkansas guest statute.
The United States Supreme Court's most recent assessment of
92. 292 Ark. at 348, 730 S.W.2d at 220 (Hays, J., dissenting).
93. 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977).
94. 263 Ark. 326, 565 S.W.2d 400 (1978).
95. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
96. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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the constitutional limits on choice of law appears in Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Shutts.97 Phillips Petroleum involved a class action
brought by certain natural gas lessors to recover interest on royalties
withheld by lessees pending federal approval of proposed price in-
creases. The Supreme Court held that Kansas' application of its law
to all of the claims arising in this case, even those of ninety-seven
percent of the plaintiffs with no apparent connection to Kansas, vio-
lated the due process clause of the federal constitution. Contrasting
the "entirely distinct" constitutional questions of personal jurisdiction
as a requisite for applying a given state's law and "the question of the
constitutional limitations on choice of law," the Court concluded that
Kansas had too tenuous a connection to support the application of
Kansas law. In reaching this conclusion, the Court drew upon the
earlier case of Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,98 which had advanced the
principle that a state "may not abrogate the rights of parties beyond
its borders having no relation to anything done or to be done within
them."9 9 This, in a nutshell, is the problem Phillips Petroleum raises
in Schlemmer; Arkansas officiously applies its law-an ersatz "better
rule" of ordinary negligence in guest statute cases which is unlike that
applied in similarly situated purely domestic cases-to abrogate the
rights of the defendant and does so irrespective of any relation to Ar-
kansas or any interest that the state might have. The rule in domestic
cases revels no interest in furthering recovery by plaintiffs to aid credi-
tors apart from the timetable prescribed in the repeal statute.
Phillips Petroleum adopts Hague's measure of the requisite nexus
demanded by the due process clause in order for a forum state to
enforce a choice of law: "[Flor a State's substantive law to be selected
in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a sig-
nificant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state
interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor funda-
mentally unfair.'
In Hague the forum state had three contacts with the litigation
plaintiff. First, plaintiff's decedent, Mr. Hague, was an employee in
the forum state. Second, the defendant insurance company "was at
all times present and doing business" in the forum state,'O° and, third,
the plaintiff became a resident of the forum prior to instituting litiga-
tion and for reasons unconnected with the litigation. None of these
97. 472 U.S. 797.
98. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
99. 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930)).
100. Id. at 818 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)).
101. 449 U.S. at 317.
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Hague contacts has an analog in the Schlemmer case. In Schlemmer
both plaintiff and defendant were from Tennessee. Also, whereas
there is no question that Arkansas courts had jurisdiction over the
accident, singling out a foreign defendant for substantially dissimilar
treatment is fundamentally unfair and lacks the appropriate contacts
which Phillips Petroleum and Hague require.
B. Privileges and Immunities
A second constitutional objection should be considered which,
although it applies to cases like Schlemmer, does not square with
Schlemmer's facts. Commentators10 2 have argued that the differential
treatment of residents and nonresidents in choice of law cases violates
the privileges and immunities clause of article IV which provides that
"[t]he citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and im-
rnunities of citizens in the several states. ' 103 Under the privileges and
immunities clause, discrimination is constitutionally permissible
against nonresidents only where: "(i) there is a substantial reason for
the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced
against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State's
objective."' 4
The Supreme Court has invalidated differential state treatment of
nonresidents in cases involving commercial fishing licenses, 10 5 medical
services, 106 employment preferences, 10 7 and restrictions on bar admis-
sions.108 Protection under the privileges and immunities clause ex-
tends, however, only to certain privileges and immunities within the
protection of the clause. 0 9 There is little doubt that factors bearing
on the liability of a party to damages would be within the clause."0
Indeed, the right "to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the
courts of the state" was among those fundamental rights identified by
102. Corr, Interest Analysis and Choice of Law: The Dubious Dominance of Domicile, 1983
UTAH L. REV. 651, 665-66; Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own,
23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 180-87 (1981); Kramer, supra note 89, at 1065-74; Laycock,
Equality and the Citizens of Sister States, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 431, 446-48 (1987).
.103. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
104. Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985).
105. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). Compare Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
436 U.S. 371 (1978).
106. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
107. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984); Hicklin v. Orbeck,
437 U.S. 518 (1978).
108. Barnard v. Thorstenn, 109 S. Ct. 1294 (1989); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Fried-
man, 487 U.S. 59 (1988); Piper, 470 U.S. 274.
109. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades, 465 U.S. 208.
110. Ely, supra note 101.
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Justice Bushrod. Washington in his delineation of the scope of the
clause in Corfield v. Coryell. I"' Clearly, maintaining a defense such as
under a guest statute would require equality of access.11 2 Arkansas
cannot justify denial of access to the guest statute defense to a nonres-
ident merely on the ground of nonresidence.
A stumbling block arises with this line of analysis, however,
where the party seeking the protection of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause is, as in Schlemmer, a corporation. Since it remains the
law that corporations (and aliens) are not "citizens" for the purposes
of the privileges and immunities clauses," 3 there would be no viola-
tion in Schlemmer. Thus, while the privileges and immunities argu-
ment would have force were the defendant an individual, a
corporation such as Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, under
hoary precedent, would not be heard to complain.
C. State Constitutional Objections
Assuming, as I do, that Schlemmer was wrongly decided, an al-
ternative constitutional ground for objection is available in the Arkan-
sas Constitution to justify another result.'" Conventional wisdom
has treated linguistically similar provisions in state and federal consti-
tutions as legally alike although there is no particular warrant for do-
ing so. Indeed, Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court has
argued that state courts should make their own independent assess-
ment even in instances where the constitutional texts are identical." 5
111. 6 Fed. Cas. 456, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
112. Compare L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 535 (2d ed. 1988) ("[W]hile
the Court had never expressly repudiated the fundamental rights limitation on privileges and
immunities analysis, that view played no substantial part in any of the Court's opinions from
Toomer v. Witsell onward.").
113. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868);
St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. State, 120 Ark. 182, 179 S.W. 342 (1915); State ex rel. Moose v.
Southern Sand & Material Co., 113 Ark. 149, 167 S.W. 854 (1914); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry.
v. State, 86 Ark. 412, 111 R.W. 456 (1908), aff'd, 219 U.S. 453 (1911); L. TRIBE, supra, note
111, at 544.
114. The potential for state constitutional law as an independent source of rights is not a
new idea; see Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1977); Hogue, Regulating Business Activity By Means of the Substantive Due Process
and Equal Protection Doctrines Under the Georgia Constitution: An Analysis and a Proposal, 3
GA. ST. U.L. REV. 1 (1986-87); Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18
GA. L. REV. 165 (1984). See, e.g., Harris v. Entertainment Systems, Inc., 259 Ga. 701, 386
S.E.2d 140 (1989) (nude dancing in establishments serving liquor protected by Georgia's con-
stitutional free expression guarantees); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989) (minor's right
to terminate a pregnancy by abortion protected by Florida's constitutional privacy
guarantees).
115. Linde, supra note 113, at 181-83.
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CONFLICT OF LAWS
Arkansas' constitution contains equality provisions that are textually
different from federal ones, and thus, the task is arguably easier. The
Schlemmer majority's willingness to treat a foreign plaintiff more fa-
vorably than a domestic one (and a foreign defendant less favorably
than a domestic one) should be held to violate a norm of parity of
treatment fairly derived from provisions of the Declaration of Rights
in the Arkansas Constitution which address equality: "The equality
of all persons before the law is recognized, and shall ever remain invi-
olate...",116 and "the General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen
or class of citizens privileges or immunities which upon the same
terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.""' 7 The equality provi-
sion, the first example above, was interpreted to allow giving out-of-
staters advantages over in-staters in Thompson v. Continental South-
ern Lines, Inc.,118 although that case, which involved allowing a tax
exemption on the first twenty gallons of motor fuel brought into the
state which was not equally available to in-staters, would seem distin-
guishable both on the nature and extent of the difference in treat-
ment. 9 With respect to the state privileges and immunities example,
the holding in Schlemmer interprets the tort statute in such a way as
to draw it into conflict with article 2, section 18 of the Arkansas Con-
stitution since the guest statute defense was in no sense "equally
[available] to all citizens." Note that this unavailability is distinguish-
able from that at issue in prior constitutional challenges to the Arkan-
sas guest statute.
In White v. Hughes120 the issue was the differential treatment of
guests and nonguests by the guest statute law by requiring guests to
prove willful and wanton negligence in order to recover. White up-
held the guest statute against inequality challenges based both on arti-
cle 2, section 18 of the Arkansas Constitution and on the equal
protection clause of the federal constitution. Interestingly, White's
116. ARK. CONST. art. 2, sec. 3.
117. ARK. CONST. art. 2, sec. 18.
118. 222 Ark. 108, 257 S.W.2d 375 (1953).
119. Id. at 112, 257 S.W.2d at 378.
Under the provisions of the [applicable statute], no citizen or class of citizens is
granted any privilege or immunity which upon the same terms is not granted to all
citizens. It is true that one entering the state may use the highways without paying
any tax on 20 gallons of gas he has in the fuel tanks, whereas one who does not enter
the state but is already here must pay a tax on each and every gallon he uses in
driving on the highways; but if this can be said to be a discrimination, it is not an
arbitrary one.
Id. Compare Davis v. Cox, 268 Ark. 78, 593 S.W.2d 180 (1980) (guest statute violates Arkan-
sas Constitution, article 2, section 3) (Mays, J., dissenting).
120. 257 Ark. 627, 519 S.W.2d 70, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 805 (1975).
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disposition of the state constitutional issue is based on a faulty use of
precedent. The opinion by Justice Byrd says that "[t]he constitution-
ality of our [Arkansas'] guest statute was upheld in Roberson v. Rob-
erson as against the argument that it contravened article 2, § 18 of the
Arkansas Constitution." 121 This is simply wrong. Examination of
Roberson reveals instead that it upheld the Arkansas guest statute
against an attack based on article 2, section 13 (entitlement to a rem-
edy for wrongs), not section 18.122 White, however, was affirmed in
Davis v. Cox i23 and is correctly decided notwithstanding its insubstan-
tial precedential base.
The argument urged here, by contrast, is that the equality princi-
ple of article 2, section 18, prohibits granting to a class of citizens
(nonresidents/noncitizens of Arkansas) a privilege or immunity (as a
plaintiff-avoiding the hurdle of showing willful and wanton negli-
gence; as a defendant-inability to plead the guest statute defense)
that is not equally available to all citizens, including Arkansas plain-
tiffs and defendants. Such an application of the state constitutional
equality principle would clearly void Schlemmer's result. It also
nicely avoids the baggage that the federal privileges and immunities
clause has picked up which prevents its application to corporate
defendants.
In sum, and apart from this proposed state constitutional ap-
proach, however, sufficient conflicts and due process constitutional
objections remain to suggest not only that Schlemmer was wrongly
decided but that the "better rule" conflicts method on which the case
relies is flawed and should be discarded. Twelve years ago I warned
that given the "inauspicious beginnings" of modem conflicts analysis
in Arkansas, the court "should view Wallis as merely having adopted
a rule of flexibility in choice of law in interstate torts rather than a
particular method or theory of choosing."' 24 That advice was not
heeded. Again, in this most recent decision, the "better rule" method
has shown itself unfaithful to its own premises. In fact, it has revealed
its flaws on the three occasions when the Arkansas Supreme Court
has applied it-Wallis, Williams, and now Schlemmer. In law as in
baseball three strikes is all we should allow.
121. Id. at 628, 519 S.W.2d at 71 (citing Roberson v. Roberson, 193 Ark. 669, 101 S.W.2d
961 (1937)) (citation omitted).
122. Roberson, 193 Ark. at 676, 101 S.W.2d at 965.
123. 268 Ark. 78, 593 S.W.2d 180 (1980).
124. Hogue, supra note 3, at 731.
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